The fifth edition of the Philosophical Dictionary leaves a very favorable impression. It is a useful mass edition. It has been considerably enlarged—by almost one hundred fifty pages compared with the fourth edition. The dictionary now contains many new articles: "Acceleration of socioeconomic development," "The human factor," "The meaning of life," "Discipline," "Social conflict," "Understanding," "Computerization," "Informatics," "Philosophy of science," "The logic of scientific cognition," "Sociobiology," "Egoconception," "Scientific materialism," "Humanity," "Ethology," etc. Many of these terms were previously not found at (...) all in our philosophical reference literature, including the Philosophical Encyclopedia [Filosofskaia entsiklopediia] and the Philosophical Encyclopedic Dictionary [Filosofskii entsiklopedicheskii slovar']. (shrink)

Nonlocal reaction–diffusion equations describe various biological and biomedical applications. Their mathematical properties are essentially different in comparison with the local equations, and this difference can lead to important biological implications. This review will present the state of the art in the investigation of nonlocal reaction–diffusion models in biomedical applications. We will consider various models arising in mathematical immunology, neuroscience, cancer modelling, and we will discuss their mathematical properties, nonlinear dynamics, resulting spatiotemporal patterns and biological significance.

Wir stellen ein präzises Modell der wissenschaftlichen Begriffs-theorie vor, in dem die Beschreibungs-, die Wirklichkeits- und die mengentheoretische Ebene verknüpft werden. Einerseits wird ein allgemeiner Rahmen für die Gesamtheit der Begriffe, andererseits die „lokale” Struktur eines Begriffs beschrieben. Wir spezialisieren diesen Rahmen auf wissenschaftliche Begriffe, wissenschaftliche Theorien, und auf die zugehörigen strukturalistischen, wissenschaftstheoretischen Konstruktionen. We introduce a precise model for the theory of concepts in philosophy of science. In this model we connect the level of description, the level of reality (...) and the level of set theoretic systems. On the one hand we describe a general frame for the collection of concepts, and on the other hand the „local” structure of a concept. We specialize this frame to scientific concepts, scientific theories, and to the appertaining structuralist constructions from philosophy of science. (shrink)

Coming fromI andCl, i.e. from intuitionistic and classical propositional calculi with the substitution rule postulated, and using the sign to add a new connective there have been considered here: Grzegorozyk's logicGrz, the proof logicG and the proof-intuitionistic logicI set up correspondingly by the calculiFor any calculus we denote by the set of all formulae of the calculus and by the lattice of all logics that are the extensions of the logic of the calculus, i.e. sets of formulae containing the axioms (...) of and closed with respect to its rules of inference. In the logiclG the sign is decoded as follows: A = (A & A). The result of placing in the formulaA before each of its subformula is denoted byTrA. The maps are defined (in the definitions of x and the decoding of is meant), by virtue of which the diagram is constructed. (shrink)

In this paper we propose an informal exposition of the structure approach in the philosophy of science. Scientific knowledge is here considered as a collection of scientific theories. Each scientific theory has logico-linguistic, model-representing, pragmatic-procedural, and problem-heuristical subsystems and a subsystem of ties. The pivotal methodological concept for the exact description of these subsystems is the named set. We also outline the possibility of applying the structure-nominative approach to certain problems in the philosophy of science.

A remarkable phenomenon in our present-day culture has been the broad interest shown in the history of Russian thought, which is continually, and sometimes even from unexpected quarters, showing itself to be of topical interest. Recently, and particularly in connection with the publication of the works of N. F. Fedorov, there has been an exchange of opinions in the pages of various journals with regard to the essence of his philosophical views, revealing not merely conflicting, but in a number of (...) cases mutually exclusive assessments of those views. (shrink)

What is philosophy and what are its distinctive features? What is its relationship to the sciences whose business it is to study the actual world? With what should philosophy concern itself?-These are the fundamental questions dealt with in the article by Alfred Ayer. These questions are important and interesting. The article is written in lively fashion and stimulates a desire to discuss these subjects. There are some matters on which we do not disagree with Ayer, but concur. At the same (...) time we would like to express some objections to certain of his basic positions. (shrink)

The articles examines the teleofunctional solution to the problem of mental causation, presented by Dmitry Volkov in his recently published book Free Will. An Illusion or an Opportunity. D.B. Volkov proposes solutions to three big metaphysical problems – mental causation, personal identity, and free will. Solving the first problem, Volkov creatively combines the advantages of Dennett’s teleofunctional model and Vasilyev’s local interactionism. Volkov’s teleofunctional model of mental causation seeks to prove the causal relevance of mental properties as non-local higher order (...) properties. In my view, its substantiation is based on three points: (a) critics of the exclusion problem and Kim’s model of mental causation, (b) “Library of first editions” argument, (c) reduction of the causal trajectories argument (CTA 1) by Vasilyev to the counterpart argument (CTA 2) by Volkov. Each of these points faces objections. Kim’s criticism is based on an implicit confusion of two types of reduction – reduction from supervenience and from multiple realizability. The latter type does not threaten Kim’s ideas, but Volkov uses this very type in his criticism. The “Library of first editions” argument does not achieve its goal due to compositional features and because non-local relational properties are a type of external properties that cannot be causally relevant. The reduction of CTA 1 to CTA 2 is unsuccessful since, in the case of this reduction, important features of CTA 1 are lost – these are local mental properties, due to which the influence of non-local physical factors occurs. My main objection is that the concept of causally relevant non-local properties is incompatible with the very concept of cause. The set of causally relevant properties of cause can only be local. (shrink)

This article is devoted to the analysis of arguments from empirical science against free will. Its main purpose is to reveal their deep anti-naturalism. This anti-naturalism lies in the use of a concept of free will that cannot be the subject of naturalistic consideration, as well as in the various explanatory and ontological paradoxes that arguments from empirical science lead in case when someone is trying to generalize the explanatory principles underlying them. At the beginning of the article, the author (...) gives a general notion of the free will problem, a working definition of naturalism and the place of arguments from empirical science in discussions about free will. To achieve the main goal of the article, the author suggests a classification of arguments from empirical science, which includes five types: from prediction, from manipulation, from the brain, from illusion, from the substitution of concepts. In accordance with this classification, the structure of the article is defined, where each of the presented types is sequentially considered. The logic of considering each type of argument is approximately the same: explication of the essence of the argument of a particular type, its analysis, identification of basic principles and their generalization, demonstration of the negative consequences that it leads to, and answers to possible objections. In the course of the consideration, the author formulates an ontologically neutral concept of free will as a set of abilities associated with the agent’s control over his actions. At the end of the article, the main points is summed up, the idea of naturalistic compatibilism is proposed, the role of arguments from empirical science in discussions about free will is clarified, as is the problem of free will itself, the question of the sources of “chimerization” of naturalism is briefly highlighted, and the problem of completeness of the proposed reasoning is touched upon. (shrink)

Modern physics is developing with extraordinary rapidity. It is passing through a tremendous revolution. The boldest and most fantastic imaginings, which only yesterday appeared virtually unrealizable, are being brought to reality in the course of this revolution.

I found Shpet's article "A Work on Philosophy" [Rabota po filosofii], which we present to the reader's attention, in the Shpet archives stored in the Lenin State Library and passed it on to the editorial board of the journal Logos, where it was published by I. Chubarov. The small circulation of that journal makes it appropriate to republish this text, which is of major importance for an understanding of Shpet's philosophical position and provides a good clarification of the subsequent logic (...) of development of his conception. Although the article is unfinished, there is no reason to lament this fact, since all of its basic ideas and their logical development were realized by Shpet in subsequent publications. A whole series of his works is devoted to grounding and affirming so-called positive philosophy, the basic features of which I would like to clarify. (shrink)

The conception on which the affirmative philosophy of G.G. Shpet rests can be called hermeneutic phenomenology. The choice of this term demands explanation. Shpet's basic hermeneutic work, Hermeneutics and Its Problems [Germenevtika i ee problemy], was completed in 1918. At the time hermeneutics was understood usually as the art of grasping the meaning of a text. It is worth noting that this art was quite specific. It consisted mostly of a set of psychological techniques for "penetrating" into the internal world (...) of the text's author. The techniques were empathy, sympathy, immersion in a historico-cultural world, and imaginative penetration into the author's creative "workshop." Understood in this way, hermeneutics was a psychologically loaded research method. And if it is treated only in that way, the recently coined term "hermeneutic phenomenology" is in respect to content internally contradictory. As I see it, Shpet fully realized what conclusions could follow from this. Nevertheless his fundamental aspirations are connected precisely with the idea of unifying hermeneutics and phenomenology. This is possible because words have a complex structure . The sense of a word is objective and can be known by nonpsychological methods. The art of comprehending the sense of a text must inevitably include semiotic methods as well as logical and phenomenological techniques. They are aimed at comprehending (studying, researching, but not "grasping" or "sympathizing with" the objective, internal sense of the text. All the other elements of the sensible structure of the text are overlaid with the psychological peculiarities of the author and historical and social conditions. They are external factors that influence the sense of the text in a distinctive way and, without question, must be taken into account and included in the investigation of texts under the general heading "conditions of understanding," which are comprehended by the historical method. The psychological and historical methods in hermeneutics were historically conditioned research techniques, scientific means of comprehending sense under conditions when semiotic means were not yet developed, contemporary logico-semantic techniques were not available, and the phenomenological method was not yet invented. For this reason hermeneutics is reducible conceptually to a mere psychological art: it was only forced into being this by the lack of technical instrumentation. Moreover, the psychological hermeneutics of the nineteenth century may be called without any exaggeration the historical variant of hermeneutics in general. (shrink)

Knowledge is systemic by its nature. The highest expression of the systematic character of knowledge is to be found in scientific theories. Any scientific theory is a rigorously organized conceptual system, quite complex in structure. What defines the manner in which knowledge is organized in a theory? Is it independent of the nature and structural features of that sphere of the material world for cognition of which the theory was created, or is it conditioned by these features and does it (...) derive from them? Is there a correspondence between the structure of knowledge concentrated in a theory and the structure of that fragment of material reality that is modeled by that theory? Is it possible at all for a theory to be a form of reflection of objective reality, if there is no definite correspondence between its structure and the structure of the region of reality to which it pertains? These questions are of primary importance to the treatment of the theory of scientific knowledge. (shrink)

Научиться искусству точечной росписи совсем несложно, если у вас есть немного свободного времени и эта замечательная книга, в которой все основные техники описаны в форме доступных, понятных и наглядных мастер-классов. С помощью этого самоучителя вы освоите 10 техник точечной росписи, научитесь декорировать самые разные поверхности, сможете создавать красивые, практичные и долговечные изделия для дома, для себя и в подарок. Точечная роспись позволит вам почувствовать себя настоящим художником, даже если прежде вы совсем не умели рисовать. Новые творческие горизонты ждут! Желаем вам (...) вдохновенного творчества! (shrink)

This paper concerns modal logics of provability — Gödel-Löb systemGL and Solovay logicS — the smallest and the greatest representation of arithmetical theories in propositional logic respectively. We prove that the decision problem for admissibility of rules (with or without parameters) inGL andS is decidable. Then we get a positive solution to Friedman''s problem forGL andS. We also show that A. V. Kuznetsov''s problem of the existence of finite basis for admissible rules forGL andS has a negative solution. Afterwards we (...) give an algorithm deciding the solvability of logical equations inGL andS and constructing some solutions. (shrink)

The paper explicates the stages of the author’s philosophical evolution in the light of Kopnin’s ideas and heritage. Starting from Kopnin’s understanding of dialectical materialism, the author has stated that category transformations of physics has opened from conceptualization of immutability to mutability and then to interaction, evolvement and emergence. He has connected the problem of physical cognition universals with an elaboration of the specific system of tools and methods of identifying, individuating and distinguishing objects from a scientific theory domain. The (...) role of vacuum conception and the idea of existence (actual and potential, observable and nonobservable, virtual and hidden) types were analyzed. In collaboration with S.Crymski heuristic and regulative functions of categories of substance, world as a whole as well as postulates of relativity and absoluteness, and anthropic and self-development principles were singled out. Elaborating Kopnin’s view of scientific theories as a practically effective and relatively true mapping of their domains, the author in collaboration with M. Burgin have originated the unified structure-nominative reconstruction (model) of scientific theory as a knowledge system. According to it, every scientific knowledge system includes hierarchically organized and complex subsystems that partially and separately have been studied by standard, structuralist, operationalist, problem-solving, axiological and other directions of the current philosophy of science. 1) The logico-linguistic subsystem represents and normalizes by means of different, including mathematical, languages and normalizes and logical calculi the knowledge available on objects under study. 2) The model-representing subsystem comprises peculiar to the knowledge system ways of their modeling and understanding. 3) The pragmatic-procedural subsystem contains general and unique to the knowledge system operations, methods, procedures, algorithms and programs. 4) From the viewpoint of the problem-heuristic subsystem, the knowledge system is a unique way of setting and resolving questions, problems, puzzles and tasks of cognition of objects into question. It also includes various heuristics and estimations (truth, consistency, beauty, efficacy, adequacy, heuristicity etc) of components and structures of the knowledge system. 5) The subsystem of links fixes interrelations between above-mentioned components, structures and subsystems of the knowledge system. The structure-nominative reconstruction has been used in the philosophical and comparative case-studies of mathematical, physical, economic, legal, political, pedagogical, social, and sociological theories. It has enlarged the collection of knowledge structures, connected, for instance, with a multitude of theoreticity levels and with an application of numerous mathematical languages. It has deepened the comprehension of relations between the main directions of current philosophy of science. They are interpreted as dealing mainly with isolated subsystems of scientific theory. This reconstruction has disclosed a variety of undetected knowledge structures, associated also, for instance, with principles of symmetry and supersymmetry and with laws of various levels and degrees. In cooperation with the physicist Olexander Gabovich the modified structure-nominative reconstruction is in the processes of development and justification. Ideas and concepts were also in the center of Kopnin’s cognitive activity. The author has suggested and elaborated the triplet model of concepts. According to it, any scientific concept is a dependent on cognitive situation, dynamical, multifunctional state of scientist’s thinking, and available knowledge system. A concept is modeled as being consisted from three interrelated structures. 1) The concept base characterizes objects falling under a concept as well as their properties and relations. In terms of volume and content the logical modeling reveals partially only the concept base. 2) The concept representing part includes structures and means (names, statements, abstract properties, quantitative values of object properties and relations, mathematical equations and their systems, theoretical models etc.) of object representation in the appropriate knowledge system. 3) The linkage unites a structures and procedures that connect components from the abovementioned structures. The partial cases of the triplet model are logical, information, two-tired, standard, exemplar, prototype, knowledge-dependent and other concept models. It has introduced the triplet classification that comprises several hundreds of concept types. Different kinds of fuzziness are distinguished. Even the most precise and exact concepts are fuzzy in some triplet aspect. The notions of relations between real scientific concepts are essentially extended. For example, the definition and strict analysis of such relations between concepts as formalization, quantification, mathematization, generalization, fuzzification, and various kinds of identity are proposed. The concepts «PLANET» and «ELEMENTARY PARTICLE» and some of their metamorphoses were analyzed in triplet terms. The Kopnin’s methodology and epistemology of cognition was being used for creating conception of the philosophy of law as elaborating of understanding, justification, estimating and criticizing legal system. The basic information on the major directions in current Western philosophy of law (legal realism, feminism, criticism, postmodernism, economical analysis of law etc.) is firstly introduced to the Ukrainian audience. The classification of more than fifty directions in modern legal philosophy is suggested. Some results of historical, linguistic, scientometric and philosophic-legal studies of the present state of Ukrainian academic science are given. (shrink)

This paper is dedicated to V. V. Rosanov views on the issue of sexual love. Analyzing the system of Rosanov’s notions of the God, nature and sex, authors show how the philosopher is trying to create pansexualistic quasireligious doctrine versus Christianity. The thinker is referred to as a radical ideologist of mystical-erotic revolution and a mouthpiece of peculiar to Russian culture trend towards the construction of a national religion.

We will outline the contributions of A.V. Kuznetsov to modal logic. In his research he focused mainly on semantic, i.e. algebraic, issues and lattices of extensions of particular modal logics, though his proof of the Full Conservativeness Theorem for the proof-intuitionistic logic KM (Theorem 17 below) is a gem of proof-theoretic art.

Russkai︠a︡ t︠erkovʹ i drugie statʹi -- V temnykh religioznykh luchakh.